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ELIMINATING ARBITRARY AGE DISCRIMINATION IN 
401(K) AND PENSION PLAN ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS: 
A SIMPLE FIX TO ENCOURAGE YOUNGER WORKERS TO 
SAVE FOR RETIREMENT 
Andrew J. Clopton* 
Current federal law allows companies to exclude their youngest workers from 
participating in 401(k) and other pension plans. Public policy should 
encourage young workers to contribute to retirement as early as practicable, 
rather than impose obstacles to saving. Workers who begin saving even a few 
years earlier improve their retirement security and reduce the likelihood they 
will be dependent on the government later in life. While “age discrimination” 
is conventionally thought of as the mistreatment of older workers, this concept 
applies equally to employees who are differentiated based solely on their 
young age. Thus, Congress should amend the Internal Revenue Code to 
prohibit retirement savings discrimination on the basis of (young) age. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the United States today, 401(k) and other pension plans are a 
standard benefit for most full-time employees in large corporations.1 
Federal tax law incentivizes employers to offer—and employees to 
participate in—pension plans.2 Approximately fifty percent of families 
“own[] retirement accounts—including individual retirement accounts 
(IRAs), Keogh accounts, and certain employer-sponsored accounts, such 
as 401(k), 403(b), and thrift savings accounts.”3 Although “[p]rivate 
retirement arrangements in the United States were once predominately 
defined benefit . . . pension plans,” most plans in the private sector today 
are “defined contribution . . . arrangements.”4 
                                                      
*   J.D., May 2015, University of Michigan Law School. 
 1.  According to the Department of Labor, there are over 500,000 401(k) type plans and 
nearly 65,000,000 active participants. See Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Private 
Pension Plan Bulletin Historical Tables and Graphs 26 E20g1 (2014). 
 2.  See Joseph Bankman, Tax Policy and Retirement Income: Are Pension Plan Anti-
Discrimination Provisions Desirable?, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 790, 790–91 (1988). 
 3.  Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2010 to 2013: Evidence from 
the Survey of Consumer Finances, 100 FED. RES. BULLETIN, Sep. 2014, at 33. 
 4.  James Poterba et al., Defined contribution plans, defined benefit plans, and the 
accumulation of retirement wealth, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 2062, 2063 (2007). “Workers covered by 
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The private sector prefers “[d]efined contribution plans, such as the 
very common 401(k)s” because these plans “are considered much less 
expensive than defined benefit plans.”5 The responsibility of managing a 
defined contribution plan falls on the employee.6 However, defined 
contribution plans generally encourage investment diversification, which 
lowers risk. Further, the most popular plans adjust asset allocation by 
“lifecycle target date”—the date of anticipated retirement.7 
In a typical 401(k) plan, an employer offers to match a certain 
percentage of an employee’s individual retirement contribution,8 making 
investment a prudent choice. Under this scheme, workers can invest a 
percentage of their income in a managed retirement account; employers 
make it easy to contribute by automatically deducting the contribution 
from paychecks and often include a matching employer contribution.9 
Many employers automatically enroll employees and make them “opt 
out” if they do not wish to participate.10 
Unfortunately, benefits legislation discriminates against young 
adults with no apparent justification. Per I.R.C. § 410, companies can 
and often do refuse to offer 401(k) benefits to employees under twenty-
one.11 
                                                      
[defined benefit] plans are increasingly concentrated in the public sector.” Id. 
 5.  JAMIE PRATT, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING IN AN ECONOMIC CONTEXT 458 (8th ed. 2010). 
“Under a defined benefit plan the employer promises to provide each employee with a specified 
amount of benefits upon retirement.” Id. 
 6.  Id. “Accounting for a defined contribution plan is relatively simple because once the 
employer makes the contribution, the sponsoring company faces no further liability.” Id. 
 7.  DELOITTE, DEFINED CONTRIBUTION/401(K) FEE STUDY 13 (2009) (“Of those plans with 
auto-enrollment, 71% default to a lifecycle target date investment option with an average default 
contribution rate of 3%.”). 
 8.  Id. at 12 (“Among respondent plans, 92% had employer contributions, typically in the 
form of a match formula.”). 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. at 13. Social science research suggests that making employees “opt-out”—rather than 
“opt-in”—significantly increases 401(k) and other retirement plan participation. See infra notes 48–
51 and accompanying text. 
 11.  I.R.C. § 410(a)(1)(A)(i) (2012). I found this out the hard way while working during 
undergraduate school—my corporate employer refused to enroll me in its standard 401(k) plan until 
I turned twenty-one. The absence of a matching contribution equaled approximately five-thousand 
dollars over a period of three years between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. The future value 
of this  five-thousand dollar contribution upon retirement at age sixty-five exceeds seventy-thousand 
dollars, assuming a six-percent average annual growth adjusted for inflation. There are yet other 
minimum age and service conditions found under United States Department of the Treasury 
regulations for other types of pension plans. The minimum-age requirements of these additional 
regulations vary, with some even setting ages older than twenty-one. For example, in 26 C.F.R. § 
1.410(a)-3(a) (2015), the general rule is that an employer may require one year of service or 
attainment of the age of twenty-five. Reading even further, the regulation has a “special rule for 
employees of certain educational institutions,” in which the age is thirty. Id. § 1.410(a)-3(c). The 
reasons for the plethora of special rules and exceptions remain rather difficult to find. 
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The notion that the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) contain a public policy 
problem is unremarkable. Titles 26 (“Internal Revenue Code”) and 29 
(“Labor”) of the United States Code—each comprising thousands of 
sections—provide work for legions of attorneys, human resources 
personnel, accountants, and bureaucrats. The sheer volume of legislation 
and regulations is, in some ways, a nightmare. This Comment argues 
that the law should prohibit discrimination with regard to retirement 
benefits solely on the basis of age. 
I. ILLUMINATING AN IRRATIONAL INCONSISTENCY 
According to a March 2013 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) survey 
of companies that offer 401(k) benefits, sixty-four percent of companies 
require employees to reach the age of twenty-one prior to enrollment.12 
The law does, however, prohibit employers from refusing older workers 
the same 401(k) plan and company matching contribution.13 In fact, the 
Code governing 401(k) plans allows companies only one other limitation 
for employee enrollment: one year of full-time service.14 Intuitively, this 
latter requirement makes sense; companies often want to ensure some 
level of commitment by the employee before expending maintenance 
and contribution costs for a retirement plan. The age requirement, 
however, is arbitrary; it is inconsistent with other age-based regulations, 
including other Internal Revenue Code and Treasury regulations. In 
addition, it is indefensible on fundamental fairness and public policy 
grounds.15 Although “age discrimination” is conventionally thought of as 
the mistreatment of older workers, this concept applies equally to 
employees who employers differentiate based solely on their young age. 
                                                      
 12.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE EMPLOYEE PLANS COMPLIANCE UNIT, SECTION 401(K) 
COMPLIANCE CHECK QUESTIONNAIRE 16 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/401k_final_report.pdf. 
 13.  I.R.C. § 410(a)(2) (2012). Protections for older workers first arose to national prominence 
with the passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 
(2012). For an overview of age discrimination as applied to older workers in employment-related 
contexts, see RAYMOND F. GREGORY, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE: OLD 
AT A YOUNG AGE (2001). See also Jonathan Barry Forman, How Federal Pension Laws Influence 
Individual Work and Retirement Decisions, 54 TAX LAW 143, 167–68 (2000). 
 14.  I.R.C. § 410(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2012). 
 15.  See supra notes 11, 13–14 and accompanying text. But see Bankman, supra note 2, at 812 
(“There have been no empirical or even theoretical studies of the effects of the anti-discrimination 
requirements. However, the aggregate labor supply is generally thought to be inelastic. A number of 
empirical studies also have concluded that, when other variables are held constant, higher benefits 
are associated with lower cash salaries.”). 
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A. Development of the “Minimum Age” and Appropriate Instances of 
Discrimination on the Basis of (Young) Age 
The United States has a long history of establishing different 
“minimum ages” in different legal contexts. Today, most rights and 
responsibilities associated with adulthood take effect at either eighteen 
or twenty-one years of age.16 Generally, society establishes most rights 
and responsibilities at eighteen, while reserving certain areas—usually 
“moral” decision-making—for twenty-one-year-olds.17 Many rights and 
responsibilities that society delays until twenty-one are borne out of 
statistics and common sense—young adults arguably need a gradual 
transition into full adulthood and its responsibilities.18 Yet, society 
delays very few financial or tax related rights or responsibilities beyond 
the age of eighteen.19 Moreover, no societal mores suggest a young 
employee should postpone saving for retirement.20 Ensuring that 
similarly situated employees invest equally in their retirements simply 
makes sense, especially in an era of high borrowing and low savings. 
The United States is not the only nation to draw seemingly arbitrary 
lines in employment rights and age standards. For instance, the United 
Kingdom dictates separate minimum wages for those aged eighteen to 
twenty (£5.13 per hour) and those aged twenty-one years or more (£6.50 
per hour).21 Nonetheless, international mistreatment of young adults is 
                                                      
 16.  Military enlistment, purchasing tobacco, full driving privileges, insurance, most financial 
contracts, etc., are generally established at the age of eighteen; adopting a child, purchasing and 
consuming alcohol, viewing adult entertainment, etc., are typically proscribed until the age of 
twenty-one. For less clarity, some benchmarks are even later, such as rental car privileges for 
twenty-five-year-olds, or earlier, such as individuals as young as twelve facing criminal proceedings 
and liability for some crimes and the privilege of viewing movies rated ‘R’ being granted at the age 
of seventeen. Yet other areas, such as gambling, offer varying age requirements across jurisdictions. 
 17.  I use the term “‘moral’ decisionmaking” to refer to choices that are typically prohibited to 
younger adults based upon societal mores—rather than simple economic freedoms. 
 18.  Despite lingering controversy over the drinking age, the Supreme Court granted broad 
deference to congressional findings that supported a uniform minimum drinking age of twenty-one. 
See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 (1987) (holding that Congress had the power to 
make five percent of highway funds to a state contingent upon its adoption of a uniform minimum 
drinking age). 
 19.  Some of the same fairness arguments might also demand protections for those under 
eighteen. This opens up many additional considerations, however, including the fact that nearly all 
minors are considered dependent for tax purposes. Certain emancipated minors, though, might 
deserve the same protections afforded to adults. 
 20.  Admittedly, saving for retirement is far from contemplation for most at age eighteen. 
However, this type of regulation reinforces the barriers to early saving. 
 21.  See National Minimum Wage Rates, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/national-minimum-
wage-rates (last updated Nov. 12, 2014).  In some ways, an hourly rate differential seems more 
perverse than 401(k) participation standards. Presumably, though, those aged eighteen to twenty 
would have an easier time securing a minimum wage job, perhaps balancing out the negative effects 
 
20 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Online [Vol. 49 
 
not by itself a valid reason for irrational discrimination.  
Providing equal benefits for employees between the ages of eighteen 
and twenty-one is a matter of fundamental fairness. Employers who 
require a minimum age simply do not equally compensate employees 
who otherwise perform the same duties, and the law endorses this 
maltreatment on the basis of (young) age.  The State, to this author’s 
awareness, does not statutorily endorse unequal compensation of two 
individuals, who otherwise possess equal qualities, characteristics, 
experience, positions, and roles, and all other attributes, on any other 
basis than age.22  
B. Applicable Legislative History 
A review of the legislative history provides insight into the current 
state of the law. One report notes that “[i]n the early years, 401(k) plans 
were subject to several legal measures . . . restricting . . . participants’ 
contribution activity. Only recently have legislators and regulators begun 
to loosen restrictions placed on these plans . . . to encourage their 
growth.”23 Since the creation of 401(k) plans, the numbers of plans and 
participants have increased dramatically.24 
Before the enactment of section 410(a), governing 401(k) 
regulations, employers “impose[d] whatever age and service 
requirements they desired, as long as the requirements did not 
discriminate in favor of officers, shareholders, supervisors or highly 
compensated employees.”25 Section 410(a) actually was designed to 
“extend coverage under retirement plans more widely.”26 Testimony in 
the Congressional Record alludes to the goal of “more equitably 
cover[ing] blue-collar workers . . . who do not wait until the age of 25 to 
start working, but who commence working right out of high school, 
                                                      
of the hourly rate differential. 
 22.  One counterargument is that non-eligible employees can and do invest of their own 
volition—outside of the framework of the company’s 401(k) or pension plan. This might be true for 
companies that provide no contribution match, but ignores the tangible value of the match by 
companies who do offer it. 
 23.  INV. CO. INST., 401(K) PLANS: A 25-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE 2 (Nov. 2006), available at 
www.ici.org/pdf/per12-02.pdf. The ICI bills itself as the “world’s leading association of regulated 
funds,” and it performs research and issues reports on a consistent basis as a core part of its mission. 
About ICI, INV. CO. INSTITUTE, http://www.ici.org/about_ici (last visited May 10, 2015). 
 24.  INV. CO. INST., supra note 23, at 3. 
 25.  T. David Cowart, Vesting, Participation and Coverage Victories for the “Little Guy” 
(Part I), 28 ALI-ABA BUS. L. COURSE MATERIALS J. 41, 51 (2004). 
 26.  120 CONG. REC. H1149 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1974) (statement of Rep. Ullman) (emphasis 
added). 
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[which] is a reality of American life.”27 Nonetheless, the initial 
regulations set the allowable minimum age requirement for pension plan 
participation at twenty-five.28  
Congress, though, lowered the permissible minimum age 
requirement to twenty-one in 1984.29 Congress set the age at twenty-one, 
rather than eighteen, despite evidence dating back to the section’s 
original enactment that indicated that many adults enter a prime working 
phase between eighteen and twenty-four.30  
Congress set the minimum age at twenty-one because of concerns 
“about balancing the benefits of early participation against the costs to 
the employers.”31 Congress reasoned that this compromise “significantly 
increase[d] coverage under private pension plans, without imposing an 
undue cost on employers.”32 The concern for imposing an undue cost on 
employers was likely overblown. Most workers between eighteen and 
twenty-one, in the dawn of their careers, earn entry-level wages. Thus, in 
the aggregate, companies would not incur significant contribution costs. 
Further, a rational employee who begins saving for retirement at 
eighteen rather than twenty-one would likely retire earlier given her 
additional savings.33 Accordingly, an earlier retirement saves the 
company on the back-end. 
Even seniors were not immune to the original regulations: upon the 
enactment of section 410(a)(2) of the IRC, Congress allowed employers 
to “exclude an employee who was hired within five years of the plan’s 
                                                      
 27.  Id. (statement of Rep. Azbug). 
 28.  Edmund T. Donovan, The Retirement Equity Act of 1984: A Review, 48 SOC. SEC. 
BULLETIN 38, 39 (May 1985). 
 29.  Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-397, § 202, 98 Stat. 1436 (codified as emended 
at 26 U.S.C. § 410 (1994). 
 30.  According to the 1970 census information available to Congress during the debates 
surrounding this section’s enactment, fifty percent of Americans between the age of eighteen and 
nineteen were in the labor force, and over sixty-eight percent of Americans between the ages of 
twenty and twenty-four were in the labor force. See 120 CONG. REC. H1283 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 
1974) (statement of Rep. Abzug). The legislative history specifically cites women as having a keen 
interest in participating in retirement plans early on: fifty-six percent of women between the ages of 
twenty and twenty-four were in the labor force. See id. With these statistics in mind, Rep. Abzug 
summed up the purpose of enacting Section 410(a) in the House of Representatives’ discussion of 
the bill: “The amendments [to the Code to enact Section 410(a)] are of particular interest to women 
whose work pattern is to work for a number of years, generally starting between 18 and 24, then 
leave to fulfill their roles as wives and mothers, and then return to work.” Id. 
 31.  Cowart, supra note 25, at 51 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 93-807, at 44 (1974), reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4710, and in 1974-3 C.B. Supp. 279). 
 32.  Id. at 52. 
 33.  Some evidence suggests that voluntary turnover rates are lower among blue-collar 
workers, particularly those in the manufacturing industry. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, USDL-15-
0210, JOB OPENINGS AND LABOR TURNOVER, tbl. 4 (Dec. 2014), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/jolts_02102015.pdf/. 
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normal retirement date.”34 Congress included this allowance to reduce 
the likelihood that employers would refuse to hire older employees due 
to increased pension costs.35 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the “maximum age 
limitation was repealed . . . for plan years beginning on or after January 
1, 1988.”36 With that change, the current system was born: companies 
may only exclude employees based on a minimum age of twenty-one or 
on one year of service.37 
Protecting very late retirement contributions was part of the pattern 
of protecting older Americans’ interests, a modern trend that began in 
the late 1960s as America’s “greatest generation”—the veterans of 
World War II—began to retire. Congress sought to eliminate 
discrimination on the basis of age for persons above the age of forty-
three with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
(ADEA).38 Interestingly, a brief congressional statement of findings and 
purpose for the ADEA precisely illustrates many of the same reasons 
that justify prohibiting (young) age discrimination in 401(k) plans: 
 
(a) The Congress hereby finds and declares that— 
(1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older 
workers find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to 
retain employment, and especially to regain employment 
when displaced from jobs; 
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential 
for job performance has become a common practice, and 
certain otherwise desirable practices may work to the 
disadvantage of older persons; 
(3) the incidence of unemployment, especially long-term 
unemployment with resultant deterioration of skill, morale, 
and employer acceptability is, relative to the younger ages, 
high among older workers; their numbers are great and 
growing; and their employment problems grave; 
(4) the existence in industries affecting commerce, of 
                                                      
 34.  Cowart, supra note 25, at 54; see Pratt, infra note 45, at 783. 
 35.  Cowart, supra note 25, at 54. 
 36.  Id. (citing Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.410(a)-4A). 
 37.  I.R.C. § 410(a)(1)(a). Of course, other general fund requirements exist; for example, “a 
defined contribution plan which provides highly compensated employees with annual contributions 
equal to 5% of compensation must provide rank-and-file employees with annual contributions of at 
least 5% of compensation.” Bankman, supra note 2, at 796. 
 38.  29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2012). 
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arbitrary discrimination in employment because of age, 
burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce. 
(b) It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to promote 
employment of older persons based on their ability rather than 
age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to 
help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems 
arising from the impact of age on employment.39 
With the exception of section (a)(3), which has arguably shifted the 
opposite way in a post-financial crisis era,40 the justifications for 
Congress prohibiting discrimination are also applicable to younger 
workers. Even considering (a)(3), real unemployment rates among 
young workers remain very high post-recession—in part because the 
official unemployment rate only takes into account those who want to 
work and who are actively looking for such employment.41 
The eligibility requirements for 401(k) and pension benefits remain 
one of the only areas in which employers may legally discriminate 
against young employees. Young employees generally do not face 
similar barriers when obtaining company health insurance and a plethora 
of other benefits. 
Further, under the I.R.C., 403(b) plans include a different set of 
restrictions. David A. Pratt notes the inconsistencies in 401(k) and 
403(b) eligibility rules,42 the latter of which forbids a one-year-service 
requirement: “[t]hese rules should be harmonized, as there is no good 
reason for having different rules for 401(k) and 403(b) plans.”43 
                                                      
 39.  29 U.S.C. § 621 (2014). 
 40.  With the recent financial crisis affecting young adults disproportionately, relative  to older 
adults, protection against age discrimination in employment should arguably encompass age more 
generally, provided that employers still may exercise preferences for experience and other factors 
correlated to a certain extent with age. See, e.g., Annie Lowrey, When Problems Start Getting Real 
. . . , N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2013, at MM12; Josh Zumbrun, Lower Job Churn Hurts Young Workers, 
WALL ST. J. (July 13, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/lower-job-churn-hurts-young-workers-
1405295773. 
 41.  See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, USDL-14-1498, EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT AMONG 
YOUTH 1 (Summer 2014), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/youth.pdf/. Even so, 
the youth unemployment rate was 14.3% in July 2014—the latest annual report specifically 
analyzing youth employment. Id. at 2. 
 42.  The 403(b) plans are a less-common public retirement investment option. See Publication 
571, Tax-Sheltered Annuity Plans (403(b) Plans), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p571/ch01.html (revised Jan. 2015)(“A 403(b) plan, also known as 
a tax-sheltered annuity (TSA) plan, is a retirement plan for certain employees of public schools, 
employees of tax-exempt organizations, and certain ministers.”). 
 43.  David A. Pratt, Nor Rhyme Nor Reason: Simplifying Defined Contribution Plans, 49 
BUFF. L. REV. 741, 781–82 (2001). 
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The fact that two plans have varying provisions is not by itself 
surprising. What is surprising is that both plans are designed to help 
grow retirement savings. In spite of that common goal, the two plans 
contain different plan participation requirements. This discrepancy 
underscores the need for reform; certain young workers are already 
protected in existing plans and others are not. 
C. Why the Current Regime? 
While many employees between the ages of eighteen and twenty-
one are impacted by this employment age discrimination, the injustice 
does not seem ripe for today’s difficult political environment. For one, 
younger voters have historically voted and mobilized at a lower rate than 
their older counterparts.44 One can easily imagine the outcry from the 
AARP and similar groups if Congress prohibited 401(k) participation for 
workers above the age of seventy-five. Indeed, the law was amended in 
the 1980s to prohibit participation discrimination against older 
workers.45 
In fact, there are actually better public policy arguments for 
preventing participation of workers near retirement. Generally, a greater 
portion of a person’s assets should reside in lower-risk investments 
when she nears retirement.46 Many companies offer standard plans for 
“target retirement ages”; these types of plans are also often available on 
the private market.47 Higher retirement savings are possible from 
sustained investment over time—beginning as early as possible.48 
Assume that Individual A invests $20,000 at age eighteen, whereas 
individual B invests the same amount, $20,000, at age twenty-one. Now 
assume that both individuals contribute $2,000 each year, and retire at 
age seventy-two. With a very conservative five percent annual yield, the 
more prudent investor accumulates over $100,000 more for retirement.49 
                                                      
 44.  See, e.g., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE 2012 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, tbl. 399 (2012), 
available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0399.pdf. 
 45.  See Pratt, supra note 43, at 783. 
 46.  FRANK REILLY & KEITH BROWN, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 
34–37 (10th ed. 2011) (“Because their earning years have concluded . . . [retirees] are very 
conscious of protecting their capital.”). 
 47.  See Vanguard Target Retirement Funds, The Vanguard Group, 
Inc., https://investor.vanguard.com/mutual-funds/target-retirement/#/ (last visited June 5, 2015). 
 48.  See REILLY & BROWN, supra note 46, at 35 (“As a result of their typically long 
investment time horizon and their future earning ability, individuals in the [‘early-to-middle years of 
their working careers’] are willing to make relatively high-risk investments in the hopes of making 
above-average-nominal returns over time.”). 
 49.  Individual A would possess a total fund worth $796,321.77; Individual B would possess a 
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What a difference three years makes! 
Alternatively, even assuming that plans targeted for retirement in 
five years or less gain an annual yield of eight percent, the total growth 
is relatively small because of the short period of investment time.  For 
example, if Individual C invests at sixty-nine and cashes out three years 
later, she would net only $2,050.50 The company’s administration costs, 
over three years, likely do not vary solely on the basis of the ages of 
Individuals A, B, and C. Yet the company does so much more for the 
younger employee (and society) by allowing participation for those aged 
eighteen and prohibiting those within three years of retirement. 
If the costs of participation are so prohibitive that employers cannot 
sustain a retirement plan without excluding a given age class for a three-
year period, as Congress claimed to justify the 401(k) minimum age 
requirement, plans should exclude every employee within three years of 
retirement and enroll employees from age eighteen. The cost to retiring 
employees would be negligible, as demonstrated by Individual C, while 
the savings to companies would likely be even greater than under the 
current regime. Differences in earnings may cause the matching 
contribution of an employee within three years of retirement to far 
exceed the contribution given to an employee at eighteen. 
Moreover, any responsible company should present these types of 
investment scenarios by reference to employee age. Retirement is 
leagues away for many workers, but offering concrete figures may 
increase the likelihood workers will begin saving early.51 Indeed, 
younger individuals’ failure to save for retirement is a systemic problem, 
in part due to high debt loads.52 Behavioral economics research suggests 
people focus more on short-term benefits and less on long-term costs.53 
                                                      
total fund worth $682,446.19. See Retirement Calculator, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/personal-finance/calculators/retirement/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2015). 
 50.  See id. 
 51.  Increased early savings might also encourage employee retention. Under a varying array 
of regulations, employers are often allowed to require certain years of service before the company’s 
match is “fully vested.” See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1053(b)(3)(D). For example, if a company required 
five years of service before guaranteeing thousands in matching employer retirement contributions, 
a worker would have to think twice before leaving. Thus, the company could reduce employee 
turnover for participating employees—especially those younger employees who are probably very 
productive. 
 52.  The failure to save for retirement is part of a broader problem of financial literacy. See 
Annamaria Lusardi et al., Financial Literacy among the Young, 44 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 358, 359 
(2010). Further, “55% of young adults report they are not saving in either an individual retirement 
account (IRA) or a 401(k) account and 40% do not have a savings account that they contribute to 
regularly.” Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 53.  For a general discussion on irrational human tendencies, especially in matters concerning 
personal finance, see, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2009); DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY 
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Even if Congress amends the law, much work remains to properly 
educate young adults on financial matters, especially involving 
retirement. Amending the law, though, would at least enable an 
otherwise ineligible young adult to consider saving for retirement 
through an employer’s plan. The added incentive of matching employer 
contributions may encourage a healthier, long-term focus. 
D. Some Additional Scenarios 
Many employers automatically opt in employees for plan 
participation—automatically enrolling them into an applicable fund—
usually withholding two to five percent of net wages.54 Automatic 
enrollment is a very important tool because saving for retirement 
requires no special initiative by the employee—in fact, eligible 
employees must explicitly opt out of saving. Research suggests that most 
employees neither opt in nor out—they maintain their default status.55 
These “defaults” can and should encourage participation (and hence, 
retirement savings).56 The withholding is more often than not bolstered 
by a matching company contribution.57 Thus, in a default opt-in regime 
with matching contribution, a total of four to ten percent of a young 
employee’s wages are set aside as a nest egg. Given the tax penalties for 
withdrawing retirement savings early,58 most employees would likely 
keep that egg incubating for the long run.59 
For example, suppose an eighteen-year-old fresh out of high school 
goes to work for a manufacturer.60 He enrolls in his company’s 401(k) 
plan, contributing five percent of his annual income and receiving a 
three percent employer match. Because he enrolled at eighteen instead of 
                                                      
IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008). 
 54.  See Deloitte, supra note 7, at 13. 
 55.  THALER & SUNSTEIN supra note 53, at 109–17. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 109. 
 58.  I.R.C. § 72(t)(1). 
 59.  At least in the long term, this also has a demonstrably positive effect on the low-wage 
worker. Assume that a company withheld five percent of an employee’s full-time minimum wage 
paycheck. (This scenario assumes 2,080 annual hours worked at $7.25/hour, equaling $15,080 in 
gross income.) In a year, this would amount to $754.  Even if that same employee never invested 
another dollar towards retirement, his nest egg would grow to nearly $50,000 at a retirement age of 
seventy-two. (Again, assuming a very conservative five percent annual yield.) Although that amount 
is insufficient for retirement, it is not an insignificant figure for a minimum wage worker. 
 60.  This scenario assumes 2,080 annual hours worked at nineteen dollars per hour, with an 
additional 520 hours of overtime at $28.50/hour, equaling $54,520 in gross income in his first year, 
with regular contributions and raises yearly until retirement. 
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twenty-one, he would have amassed an additional few hundred thousand 
dollars at retirement after factoring in annual contributions and raises 
until retirement. This would allow the employee to retire early or simply 
to live more comfortably when he retires. The employee would also 
likely depend less on government assistance during retirement and leave 
a greater inheritance and/or bequests to charitable organizations. 
Personal savings are more imperative than ever before because of the 
United States’ growing fiscal insolvency and lack of political consensus 
on the correct methods to tackle our long-term fiscal woes—both 
collective and individual.61 Although Social Security is stable at present, 
its long-term viability remains uncertain.62 In any case, Social Security is 
not intended to be an individual’s sole means of support in retirement, 
although many Americans over-depend on Social Security today.63 
From a practical standpoint, the more money a worker saves, the less 
he or she will depend on government assistance during retirement. As 
life expectancy increases, adequate retirement savings are imperative. 
When employees invest in retirement a few years earlier it pays 
significant dividends down the road.64 Of course, expanding retirement 
benefits to more people depends on the security of those benefits.65 The 
uncertainty of a few weak plans, however, is substantially outweighed 
by the benefits of encouraging early savings across the board. Society 
benefits from increased wealth. 
A prudent government should encourage and incentivize retirement 
saving.66 Because of compound interest, a young employee who cannot 
                                                      
 61.  As of this writing, the national debt exceeded $17 trillion. As of 2012, the average 
American household with at least one credit card has at $15,590 in credit card debt. That figure 
simply includes credit card debt, omitting other more substantial sources of debt, such as mortgages 
and student loans. See CNN MONEY, MONEY ESSENTIALS: CONTROLLING YOUR PERSONAL DEBT, 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/moneymag/money101/lesson9/ (last visited June 5, 2015). 
 62.  See, e.g., Stephen C. Goss, U.S. Soc. Security Admin., The Future Financial Status of the 
Social Security Program, 70 SOC. SECURITY BULL., no. 3, Aug. 2010, at 111, available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v70n3/v70n3p111.html. 
 63.  The Social Security Administration notes “[a]mong elderly Social Security beneficiaries, 
22% of married couples and about 47% of unmarried persons rely on Social Security for 90% or 
more of their income.” There is certainly a massive wealth disparity, though, given that total Social 
Security benefits represent “38% of the income of the elderly.” Those retirees who are less 
dependent on Social Security likely draw much of their income on retirement savings gained 
through their own employment, pensions and otherwise. See OFFICE OF SOCIAL SECURITY, “Social 
Security Basic Facts” (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/basicfact.htm. 
 64.  See supra Part I.C. 
 65.  Many individuals in modern waves of bankruptcy have seen their pensions destroyed, 
although this has been most problematic amongst unsustainable state and local government pension 
liabilities—not the private sector. 
 66.  All fault does not lie with government, though. Nothing in the law prohibits companies 
from offering benefits participation for young workers. Many companies actually do allow such 
participation and should be commended for doing so. See supra text accompanying note 14. 
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save does not simply forego the value of three years’ wages. The loss 
also includes every subsequent year of investment and any additional 
contributions, magnifying the effect. 
II. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Legislative action is the best opportunity to prohibit plan 
participation discrimination on the basis of (young) age. 
Underrepresented classes, at times, turn to the courts when they fail to 
galvanize the elected branches to change.67 Younger adults certainly 
possess less political clout than older adults; in this case, however, the 
courts do not provide a very hopeful avenue to seek change. 
The only valid claim that affected employees could use to challenge 
the law would be an alleged Equal Protection Clause violation for 
employees between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. However, for 
purposes of a constitutional analysis, workers between eighteen and 
twenty-one are not considered a “suspect class.” Therefore, the 
government only needs a “rational basis” for making the distinction in 
the appropriate ERISA and IRC provisions.68 A court using the “rational 
basis” test generally employs blanket deference to the elected branches 
of government.69  The silver lining to pursuing court action is that one 
only needs a few zealous advocates to make an argument. By contrast, 
an Act of Congress takes a legion of advocates. 
One other obstacle to filing a lawsuit is that courts have at times 
avoided entanglement with complicated ERISA and IRC regulations. At 
least regarding ERISA regulations, courts have refused to recognize that 
the regulations create any substantive rights in themselves: 
The [Treasury] regulations purport to do no more than determine 
whether a plan is a qualified tax plan. Failure to meet the 
requirements of those regulations results in the loss of a 
beneficial tax status; it does not permit a court to rewrite the 
                                                      
 67.  Perhaps partially due to increasing political gridlock, advocates for social change may 
increasingly turn to the courts to resolve grievances. 
 68. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955). The legislative history 
arguably provides a sufficient rational basis to survive a constitutional challenge. Congress 
compromised with regard to minimum participation standards in order to shield employers from 
added costs associated with expanded retirement plan participation. See supra notes 29–32; 
Cowart, supra note 25, at 51. 
 69.  Congress had a debate through the political process about minimum participation 
standards and the youngest workers lost. Ironically, that same political process, then, may provide 
the only remedy to address a substantial public policy issue. 
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plan to include additional employees. The Treasury regulations 
do not create substantive rights under ERISA that would permit 
the relief [plaintiff] requests.70 
Thus, standing derived from the regulations alone seems to be 
foreclosed—the regulations simply define eligible plans under the 
applicable ERISA and IRC regulations. In any event, the dreaded 
“political option” is probably still the best hope for reform. 
Congress should immediately prohibit retirement benefits 
discrimination on the basis of (young) age in 401(k) and other applicable 
pension plans. As noted, the law currently allows employers to prohibit 
participation in a number of 401(k) and pension plans through two 
limitations: a one year of service requirement and a minimum age 
threshold—which is usually twenty-one. For example, the 401(k) 
regulations read as follows: 
(a) Participation 
(1) Minimum age and service conditions 
(A) General rule 
A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under section 
401(a) if the plan of which it is a part requires, as a 
condition of participation in the plan, that an employee 
complete a period of service with the employer or 
employers maintaining the plan extending beyond the 
later of the following dates— 
(i) the date on which the employee attains the age of 21; 
or 
(ii) the date on which he completes 1 year of service.71 
 Other pension plan participation sections mirror this language, 
suggesting that the “original compromise” has simply permeated all 
applicable language.72 The law should simply amend “21” to “18” in 
Section 410(a)(1)(A)(i).73 This would also offer further consistency with 
                                                      
 70.  Edes v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 417 F.3d 133, 144 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Abraham v. 
Exxon Corp, 85 F.3d 1126, 1131 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
 71.  I.R.C. § 410(a) (2012). 
 72.  See, e.g., id. § 416(a) (2012). 
 73.  Id. § 410 (2012) (proposing modifications to the section). 
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the general financial autonomy of baseline adults who turn eighteen. 
Further discussion of Section 410(a)(1)(A)(ii) may be warranted. As 
quoted above, this section permits employers to require one year of 
service prior to employee participation in an employer-provided 
retirement plan. In contrast to Section 410(a)’s age prohibition, this 
requirement makes practical sense and is neutral across all ages. Before 
a company accrues the cost of enrolling and managing an employee’s 
retirement plan, it may want a signal that the employee is committed. 
Permitting such a requirement seems reasonable. In effect, the proposed 
change and the year-of-service requirement may act in conjunction to 
preclude many individuals at the age of eighteen from participation 
altogether. However, if an employee worked for the same company prior 
to the age of eighteen, he or she may participate in the plan upon 
reaching that age. Ultimately, this is a very simple proposed change that 
will make a substantial difference in the lives of many young adults. 
Numerous regulatory agencies, including the Treasury Department 
and IRS, maintain enforcement control over the applicable ERISA and 
IRS provisions, including interpreting ambiguities in the Code. Yet, 
minimum requirements for plan participation are unequivocal across the 
various statutory sources. Thus, Congress must amend the Code to 
reflect the proposed change. This is not unprecedented—Congress has 
tweaked the applicable benefits laws for decades, including eliminating 
the old provisions that allowed discrimination against older workers. 
Congress should agree to a simple up-or-down vote on the narrow 
proposed modification above, and save other debates for later. However, 
the best prospects for amending the law would probably involve burying 
an amendment in a broader package of legislation.74 In today’s 
politically polarized environment, adopting even the simplest and most 
common-sense reforms presents challenges. This is especially true as it 
relates to the Internal Revenue Code. Numerous elected officials would 
take any opportunity to amend the Code, and increasing partisanship 
could cause the entire effort to fail.75 Further, this amendment would 
likely not provide the political spark for amending the Code in the first 
place. 
In theory, this change may not garner much opposition, assuming 
there were other more pressing issues to mobilize lobbyists. The 
amendment would require a sympathetic legislator on the relevant 
                                                      
 74.  An example is the drinking age provision in the transportation funding legislation 
involved in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 (1987). See supra note 18. 
 75.  See Clio Andris et al., The Rise of Partisanship and Super-Cooperators in the U.S. House 
of Representatives, PLOS ONE Apr. 21, 2015. 
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committee to insert a small change to the law that carries a big upside for 
our future generations. 
Incentivizing our youngest generations to work and save is 
paramount to our financial sustainability as a nation. With the uncertain 
long-term future of Social Security, Medicaid, and other entitlement 
programs, personal responsibility in retirement planning demands our 
attention. Congress should amend the law to prohibit employers from 
shutting out eighteen to twenty-one year olds from plan participation. 
Retirement investments at an earlier age provide numerous benefits.76 
The idea that the law explicitly allows companies to discriminate against 
those who have the most potential to compound their savings is 
disappointing. Fundamental fairness and the social benefit of increased 
retirement savings collectively outweigh marginal increases in plan 
administration and matching-contribution costs. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress should immediately amend the Internal Revenue Code to 
prohibit retirement benefits discrimination against employees between 
the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. Perhaps society can justify treating 
young adults differently under certain circumstances, but disparate 
treatment must relate to a sensible purpose. The current IRC regime 
allows employers to treat similarly situated employees differently and to 
discriminate without a well-reasoned purpose. Society can and should 
encourage its youngest eligible adults to save for retirement early and it 
can do so easily by ensuring that young people are treated equally. 
                                                      
 76.  See, e.g., supra Part I.D. 
